Scientific Truth as a Regulative Ideal of Knowledge

Abstract

Abstract. The article addresses the problem of scientific knowledge validity in the context of contemporary methodological discussions. The relevance of the study is determined by the blurring of boundaries between science, pseudoscience, and propaganda in conditions of information chaos, as well as the use of scientific rhetoric for manipulative purposes, which intensifies the need for clear criteria for demarcating well-founded knowledge from its imitations. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the understanding of scientific truth as a regulative ideal of knowledge that maintains orientation toward objectivity while avoiding the extremes of naive realism and destructive relativism. The methodological basis of the study comprises comparative analysis of classical conceptions of truth, historical-philosophical reconstruction of post-positivist discussions in twentieth-century philosophy of science, and functional analysis of the role of the ideal of truth in the organization of scientific activity. The results of the study demonstrate that classical conceptions of truth – correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic – capture important aspects of cognitive activity, yet none of them provides a definitive solution to the problem of scientific knowledge validity. Twentieth-century philosophy of science, from the verificationism of the Vienna Circle to I. Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes, demonstrated the impossibility of both complete verification and definitive falsification of theories, revealing the historical variability of the very standards of rationality. The conception of truth as a regulative ideal, drawing on the Kantian tradition of distinguishing between constitutive and regulative principles of reason, offers a balanced epistemological position: truth functions as a horizon of knowledge, guiding research activity without guaranteeing ultimate achievement. Six functions of the ideal of truth in the organization of science are identified: normative, motivational, critical, integrative, demarcational, and selective. The criteria for approximating truth – empirical adequacy, explanatory power, predictive capacity, simplicity, and coherence with the body of knowledge – are analyzed, and their significance as instruments for countering pseudoscience and propaganda in contemporary conditions is demonstrated.